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Abstract. This paper presents an approach to provide strong assurance
of the secure execution of distributed event-driven applications on shared
infrastructures, while relying on a small Trusted Computing Base. We
build upon and extend security primitives provided by a Protected Module
Architecture (PMA) to guarantee authenticity and integrity properties
of applications, and to secure control of input and output devices used
by these applications. More specifically, we want to guarantee that if an
output is produced by the application, it was allowed to be produced by
the application’s source code. We present a prototype implementation as
an extension of Sancus, a light-weight embedded PMA that extends the
TI MSP430 CPU. Our evaluation of the security and performance aspects
of our approach and the prototype show that PMAs together with our
programming model form a basis for powerful security architectures for
dependable systems in domains such as Industrial Control Systems, the
Internet of Things or Wireless Sensor Networks.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the problem of securely executing distributed applications
on a shared infrastructure with a small Trusted Computing Base (TCB). We
want to provide the owner of such an application with strong assurance that
their application is executing securely. We focus on (1) authenticity and integrity
properties of (2) event-driven distributed applications, because for this security
property and class of applications, it is relatively easy to specify the exact security
guarantees offered by our approach. But we believe our approach to be valuable
for any kind of distributed application (event-driven or not). In particular, our
prototype supports arbitrary C code for building distributed applications.
The approach discussed here has been experimented with in previous work,
where a secure smart metering infrastructure [12] is built, which we build upon,
generalize and partly formalize. Roughly speaking, our notion of authentic execu-
tion is the following: if the application produces a physical output event (e.g.,
turns on an LED), then there must have happened a sequence of physical input
events such that that sequence, when processed by the application (as specified
in the high-level source code), produces that output event. Let us elaborate this.
First, it is clear that authentic execution gives no availability guarantees: if the
execution never produces any output, then it is vacuously secure. Extending our
approach with availability guarantees is a challenging direction for future work.
Second, while our implementation does offer confidentiality, this is not the focus
of this paper: We specify authentic execution without confidentiality guarantees,
i.e., attackers can observe events in the system. Indeed, securing applications
in domains such as safety-critical control systems requires authenticity while
confidentiality is typically not desired so as to simplify system monitoring and
forensics. Third, authentic execution does provide strong integrity guarantees:
it rules out both spoofed events as well as tampering with the execution of
the program. Informally, if the executing program produces an output event,
it must also have produced that same event if no attacker was present. Any
physical output event can be explained by means of the untampered code of the
application, and the actual physical input events that have happened.
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) The design of an approach for
authentic execution of event-driven programs under the assumption that the
execution infrastructure offers specific security primitives – standard Protected
Modules (PMs) [16] plus support for secure I/O (Sect. 3). (2) A novel technique for
implementing such support for secure I/O by means of protected driver modules
on small microprocessors such as the MSP430 (Sect. 4). (3) A prototype imple-
mentation of the approach for an MSP430 microprocessor where all security prim-
itives are implemented in hardware, which results in a very small TCB (Sect. 4).
(4) An evaluation of the performance and security aspects of that implementation
(Sect. 5). Our complete implementation and all supplementary materials, includ-
ing a formalization and proof sketch of our security guarantees, are available at
https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/~jantobias.muehlberg/stm17/.
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Fig. 1. Our running example with two applications, AAvl (purple) and AVio (dark
orange). Hardware (N∗ and D∗) is trusted; the OS as well as the network are untrusted.
E.g., the AVio deployer creates the three red PMs (cf. Fig. 2a) with a trusted compiler,
attests the shared parking sensor-, clock- and display drivers and sets-up connections
between the PMs. Remote attestation assures authentic execution of AAvl and AVio.
2 Running Example, Infrastructure & Objectives
Fig. 1 (source code in Fig. 2) shows a running example for the kind of system
we consider: a sensor network on a parking lot with two parking spots. The
infrastructure can be reused for multiple applications which can be provided
by different stakeholders. Applications include parking guidance, parking lot
utilization analysis, or detection of cars that violate parking rules. We show two
of these applications: one (AVio) that detects and displays parking violations,
and another (AAvl) that displays the number of available parking spots.
The Shared Infrastructure. The infrastructure is a collection of nodes (Ni),
where each node consists of a processor, memory, and a number of I/O devices
(Di). Multiple mutually distrusting stakeholders share the infrastructure to
execute distributed applications (Ai). For simplicity, we assume processors are
simple microprocessors such as the MSP430 used in our prototype.
An I/O device interfaces the processor with the physical world and facilitates
(1) sensing some physical quantity (e.g., the state of a switch), (2) influencing
some physical quantity (e.g., an LED), and (3) notifying the processor of some
state change (e.g., a key being pressed) by issuing an interrupt.
In our running example, there are 5 nodes. Two of these (NP1 and NP2) are
each attached to two input devices (a clock DTi and a car presence detector
DPi), and are installed on parking spots. Two other nodes (ND1 and ND2) are
connected to display devices (DDi) and show the output of the applications. One
node (NAgg) is not connected to any I/O device but performs general purpose
computation, e.g., aggregating data from multiple sensor nodes.
module VioP1
on Button(pressed ):
if pressed: taken = 1
else:
taken = 0
count = 0
Violation (0)
on Tick ():
if taken: count = count + 1
if count > MAX: Violation (1)
module VioP2
# Similar to VioP1
module VioD
on Violation1(violated)
v1 = violated
if v1: Display (1)
if v2: Display (2)
on Violation2(violated ):
# Similar to Violation1
(a) AVio
module AvlP1
on Button(pressed ):
CarMoved(pressed)
module AvlP2
# Similar to AvlP1
module Agg
on CarMoved1(entered ):
p1 = entered
num_avl = NUM_PARKINGS
if (p1): num_avl = num_avl - 1
if (p2): num_avl = num_avl - 1
AvlChanged(num_avl)
on CarMoved2(entered ):
# Similar to CarMoved1
module AvlD
on AvlChanged(num_avl)
Display(num_avl)
(b) AAvl
Fig. 2. Source of the applications from Fig. 1. PMs are declared using the module
keyword and span until the next module or the end of the file. on starts an event handler
which can connect to an output of another PM, or to a physical I/O channel. Outputs
are implicitly declared when invoked through a function call-like syntax.
Modules & Applications. We use an event-driven application model and
modules (Mi) contain input- and output channels. Upon reception of an event on
an input channel, the corresponding event handler is executed atomically and
new events on the module’s output channels may be produced.
An application, then, is a collection of modules together with a deployment
descriptor. This descriptor specifies on which nodes the modules should be
installed as well as how the modules’ channels should be connected. Channels can
be connected in two ways. First, one module’s output channel can be connected
to another’s input channel, behaving like a buffered queue of events. Second,
the infrastructure can provide a number of physical I/O channels which can
be connected to a module’s I/O channels. The infrastructure must ensure that
events on such channels correspond to physical events: An event received on a
physical input could correspond to a button press or, an event produced on a
physical output could turn on an LED. A key contribution of this paper is a way
to securely connect modules to physical I/O channels (Sect. 4).
In our example applications (Fig. 1), AVio consists of three modules: two
(MVioP1 and MVioP2) are deployed on parking spots and detect single violations
and one (MVioD) aggregates and displays all violations. The two parking spot
modules have two inputs that are connected to input devices provided by the
infrastructure: one that produces events for cars entering and exiting the parking
spot (DPi) and another that sends periodical timer events (DTi). As the source
code (Fig. 2a) shows, these modules wait for a car enter event, then for a maximum
number of timer events and then produce an output event to indicate a violation.
These output events are connected to the inputs of MVioD which in turn produces
output events for all violations and sends them to the output display DD1.
Attacker Model. We consider powerful attackers that can manipulate all the
software on the nodes. Attackers can deploy their own applications on the
infrastructure, but they can also tamper with the OS. Attackers can also control
the communication network that nodes use to communicate with each other.
Attackers can sniff the network, can modify traffic, or can mount man-in-the-
middle attacks. With respect to the cryptographic capabilities of the attacker,
we follow the Dolev-Yao model [5].
Attacks against the hardware are out of scope. We assume the attacker not to
have physical access to the nodes, neither can they physically tamper with I/O
devices. We also do not consider side-channel attacks against our implementation.
While physical protection and side-channel resistance are important, they are
orthogonal and complementary to the protection offered by our approach.
Security Objective. The deployer uses his own (trusted) computing infras-
tructure to compile the application A, to deploy the modules to the nodes in
the shared infrastructure, and to configure connections between modules, and
between modules and physical I/O channels. At run-time, an actual trace of
physical I/O events will happen, and the deployer can observe an actual sequence
of physical output events. We say that this sequence of outputs is authentic for
an application A if it is allowed by A’s modules and deployment descriptor in
response to the actual trace of input events: the source code of A explains the
physical outputs on the basis of actual physical inputs that have happened.
For instance for AVio, suppose we have physical events where a car arrives
on parking 1, MAX clock ticks pass and then the display shows a 1. The trace of
outputs is an authentic trace for AVio, because its source code allows for this
display event given the physical input events. A trace for the same sequence of
physical events, but now ending with the display showing a 2, is not authentic.
Our objective is to design a deployment algorithm such that the deployer
can efficiently check authenticity of traces. If the deployer observes a trace of
physical output events, and the authenticity check of the deployer succeeds, then
our approach guarantees that this trace of output events is authentic.
This security notion rules out a wide range of attacks, including attacks where
event transmissions on the network are spoofed or reordered, and attacks where
malicious software tampers with the execution of modules. Other relevant attacks
are not covered by this security objective. As discussed earlier, there are no
availability guarantees – e.g., the attacker can suppress network communication.
There are also no confidentiality guarantees: the attacker is not prevented from
observing events. However, although this is not the focus of our design, our
implementation does come with substantial protection of the confidentiality of
the application’s state as well as the information in events (Sect. 5).
3 Authentic Execution of Distributed Applications
We outline our requirements for the infrastructure wrt. security features, and
show how these features are used effectively to accomplish our security goals.
Underlying Architecture: PMAs. Given the shared nature of the infrastruc-
ture assumed in our system model, we require the ability to isolate source modules
from other code running on a node. Since an important non-functional goal is to
minimize the TCB, relying on a classical omnipotent kernel to provide isolation
is ruled out. Therefore, we assume the underlying architecture is a PMA [16].
While details vary between PMAs, isolation of software modules is understood
as follows: A module must be able to specify memory locations containing data
that are accessible by the module’s code only (data isolation). The code of a
module must be immutable and a module must specify a number of entry points
through which its code can be executed (code isolation). For simplicity we further
assume that both a module’s code and data are located in contiguous memory
areas called, respectively, its code section and its data section.
We also expect the availability of a compiler that targets PMs on the underly-
ing architecture. The input to this compiler is as follows: (1) a list of entry point
functions; (2) a list of non-entry functions; (3) a list of variables that should be
allocated in the isolated data section; and (4) a list of constants that should be
allocated in the isolated code section. The output of the compiler should be a
PM suitable for isolation on the underlying architecture.
Besides isolation, we expect the PMA to provide a way to attest the correct
isolation of a PM. Attestation provides proof that a PM with a certain identity
has been isolated on the node, where the identity of a PM should give the deployer
assurance that this PM will behave as the corresponding source code module.
After enabling isolation, the PMA is capable of establishing a confidential,
integrity protected and authenticated communication channel between a PM and
its deployer. Although the details of how this works may differ from one PMA to
another, for simplicity we assume the PMA establishes a shared secret between
a PM and its deployer and provides an authenticated encryption primitive. We
refer to this shared secret as the module key. The authentication property of the
communication channel refers to a PM’s identity and hence to attestation. Thus,
the PMA ensures that if a deployer receives a message created with a module
key, it can only have been created by the corresponding, correctly isolated, PM.
Mapping source modules to PMs. To map a source module to a PM, we
use the following procedure. First, each of the source module’s inputs and
outputs is assigned a unique connection identifier. The format of this identifier is
unimportant as long as it uniquely specifies a particular input or output.
A table (KeyTable) is added to the PM’s variables that maps connection
identifiers to symmetric keys such that every connection has one key associated
with it. These keys will be initialized to all zeros by the architecture, which is
interpreted as an unconnected input or output. For establishing a connection,
an entry point is generated (SetKey). This entry point takes a connection iden-
tifier and a key – encrypted using the module key – as input and updates the
corresponding mapping in KeyTable if it is not already set (Fig. 3).
def SetKey(payload ):
try:
conn_id , key = Decrypt(payload)
if KeyTable[conn_id] == 0:
KeyTable[conn_id] = key
except: pass
Fig. 3. Pseudocode of the SetKey en-
try point using a Python-like syntax.
Note that Decrypt uses the module key
to decrypt the payload and throws an
exception if the operation failed (i.e.,
the payload’s MAC is incorrect).
def HandleInput(conn_id , payload ):
try:
key = KeyTable[conn_id]
if key != 0:
cb = CbTable[conn_id]
nonce = NonceTable[conn_id]
cb(Decrypt(nonce , payload , key))
NonceTable[conn_id] += 1
except: pass
Fig. 4. Pseudocode of the
HandleInput entry point. Erro-
neous accesses to the tables as well as
errors during Decrypt cause exceptions.
Thus, these events, as well as those for
which no input key has been set, are
ignored. Decrypt it takes a key and the
expected associated data as arguments.
def HandleOutput(conn_id , data):
key = KeyTable[conn_id]
if key != 0:
nonce = NonceTable[conn_id]
NonceTable[conn_id] += 1
payload = Encrypt(nonce , data , key)
HandleLocalEvent(conn_id , payload)
Fig. 5. Pseudocode of the generated
output wrapper. Since the compiler gen-
erates calls to this function and it can-
not be called from outside the module,
the connection identifier is always valid
and no error checking is necessary.
Since every connection needs to be protected from reordering and replay
attacks, the compiler adds another table (NonceTable) to the PM’s variables.
This table maps connection identifiers to the current nonce for each connection.
All the module’s event handlers are marked as non-entry functions. A callback
table (CbTable) is added to the PM’s constants that maps connection identifiers
of inputs to the corresponding event handlers. This table is used by the entry point
HandleInput, which is called when an event is delivered to the PM. HandleInput
takes two arguments: a plain-text connection identifier and an encrypted payload.
If KeyTable has a key for the given identifier it is used to decrypt the payload
(using the expected nonce as associated data), which is then passed to the callback
function stored in CbTable. If any of these operations fails, the event is ignored
(Fig. 4). From a programmer’s perspective, an input callback is only called for
events that were generated by entities with access to valid connection keys.
Each call to an output is replaced by a call to HandleOutput. This func-
tion takes a connection identifier and a payload, encrypts the payload together
with the current connection nonce (which is incremented afterwards) using
the corresponding connection key and publishes it to the event manager (via
HandleLocalEvent), passing it the connection identifier. If the output is currently
unconnected, the output event will be dropped (Fig. 5).
To conclude, the following PM definition will be given as input to the PMA
compiler: (1) SetKey and HandleInput as entry points; (2) input event handlers
and HandleOutput as non-entry functions; (3) KeyTable, NonceTable, and mod-
ule-global variables; and (4) CbTable and module constants as constants. Fig. 6
shows the compiled memory layout of one of the example modules.
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Untrusted Software on the Nodes. To support the deployment of mod-
ules and the exchange of events between modules, untrusted (and unprotected)
software components need to be installed on the nodes, as outlined here.
Module Loader. The module loader is an untrusted software component running
on every node. It listens for two types of remote requests: LoadModule and
CallEntry. LoadModule takes a compiled PM as input, loads it into the PMA
and returns the module’s unique identifier together with all information necessary
for attestation and module key establishment. What exactly this information is
and how the attestation and key establishment is performed is specific to the used
PMA. CallEntry takes a PM’s identifier, the identifier of an entry point and
potentially some arguments and calls the entry point with the given arguments.
Event Manager. The event manager is another untrusted software component
running on every node that is used to route events from outputs to inputs.
It recognizes three types of requests: AddConnection, HandleLocalEvent and
HandleRemoteEvent. A deployer can invoke AddConnection remotely to connect
the output of a module to the input of another. How exactly inputs and outputs
are identified is implementation specific but it will in some form involve specifying
(1) a node address (e.g., an IP address); (2) a PM identifier; and (3) a connection
identifier. As will become clear later, AddConnection only needs to be called on
the event manager of the node where the output source module is deployed.
HandleLocalEvent is used by modules to publish an event; i.e., inside the out-
put wrappers. The arguments are the module- and connection identifiers and the
event payload. Based on the identifiers the event manager looks up the destination
event manager and invokes its HandleRemoteEvent API, providing the identifiers
of the input to which the request should be routed. For a HandleRemoteEvent
request, the event manager will check if the destination module exists and, if
so, invoke its HandleInput entry point, passing the connection identifier and
payload as arguments.
Physical Input and Output Channels. We assume that the infrastructure
offers physical input and output channels using protected driver modules that
translate application events into physical events and vice versa. For input channels,
these modules generate events that correspond to physical events and provide a
way for application modules to authenticate the generated events. For output
channels, a driver module (MD) must have exclusive access to its device (D) and
allow an application module (MA) to take exclusive access over the driver. That
is, the driver will only accept events – and hence translate them to physical events
– from the application module currently connected to it. The infrastructure must
also provide a way for the deployer of MA to attest that it has exclusive access to
MD and that MD also has exclusive access to D. The deployer must be able to
attest MD to ensure that it indeed only accepts events from the module currently
having exclusive access and that it does not release this exclusive access without
being asked to do so by the module itself.
Deployment. Deployment is the act of installing all application modules on
their nodes and setting up the connections between outputs and inputs. All
computations described in this section are run on the deployer’s infrastructure
and are therefore trusted. Communication is performed over an untrusted network.
In phase 1, the deployer starts by compiling each source module into a
loadable image. Then, the deployment descriptor is used to find the node on
which the module should be deployed and sends its module loader a LoadModule
request. The deployer then performs the PMA-specific method of attestation and
setting up the module key. At the end of this step, the deployer has a secure
communication channel with each of its deployed source modules.
To complete phase 1, the deployer sets up the connections between modules
(not yet the connections to physical I/O channels). The deployer will generate a
unique connection key and send it to both endpoints of the connection. Sending
the key to a PM is done by first encrypting it together with the connection
identifier using the module key. This payload is then passed to the SetKey entry
point using the module loader’s CallEntry API.
Next (phase 2) the deployer sets up the connections to the physical I/O
channels. The deployer first sets up the connection to physical outputs (phase
2a). This is the point in time from which we know that outputs will be authentic.
Finally, all connections to physical inputs are set up (phase 2b).
Security Argument. Our goal is to ensure that all physical output events can
be explained by the application’s source code and the observed physical input
events More precisely: Consider a time frame starting at the end of phase 2a
of deployment (Sect. 3), and ending at a point where the deployer starts an
attestation of a specific protected driver module for an output device DO. If
this attestation succeeds, and if the deployer has observed a specific sequence of
physical output events on DO in the considered time frame, then there have been
contiguous sequences of physical input events on the input devices connected to
the application such that the observed outputs follow from these inputs according
to the application source code semantics.
As an example, consider AVio (Fig. 2a). If, after the application has been
deployed, a “1” appears on the display, and if attestation confirms that the driver
of the display is still in the expected state, then there must have been physical
input events of a car arriving on parking spot 1 and MAX clock ticks.
Since output events can only be produced by the application’s PMs; the
assumption of a correct compiler then leads to the desired property. Because
(1) a physical output event can only be produced by the corresponding device
(DO); (2) output drivers have exclusive access to their device; and (3) a PM
(MO) has exclusive access to the driver; only MO can initiate physical outputs
on DO. The successful attestation of the output driver module after the outputs
have been observed ensures that exclusive access was maintained over the entire
considered time frame. The construction of PMs ensures that a module can only
be invoked through its two entry points. Of these, only HandleInput can result
in output events (Figs. 3 and 4). Since HandleInput authenticates its input,
output events are always the result of correct input events. Since our deployment
scheme only allows for two types of correct input events, physical input events
and outputs from other modules, our security property follows.
4 Implementation
We have created a fully functional prototype of our design based on the
hardware-only PMA Sancus [14], which we briefly introduce here. We provide
both the necessary compiler extensions to compile source modules to Sancus
PMs and the runtime components to deploy applications on Contiki [6] based
networks. A novelty of our work are driver PMs that facilitate secure I/O.
Sancus. Sancus [14] is an MSP430-based PMAs, designed for low-cost and low-
power embedded applications. As described in Sect. 3, Sancus divides PMs in
two sections called the public code section and the private data section, and
enforces strict access rules. A PM’s code section can only be entered through a
single entry point: its first instruction. The compiler assigns each user-defined
entry point an integer identifier and adds an entry stub that evaluates such an
identifier, dispatching to the correct entry point.
Sancus uses a three-level key hierarchy for remote attestation and secure
communication. Every node contains a node key, which is only known by the
owner of the node, the infrastructure provider. Every vendor who is to install
PMs on a particular node is assigned a unique identifier. The second level of keys,
vendor keys, is derived from the node key and these vendor identifiers. Finally,
module keys are derived from a vendor key using a PMs module identity. This
module identity – the concatenation of the contents of the module’s code section
and the load addresses of both its sections – is used for all authentication and
attestation purposes. The module key is calculated by the Sancus hardware when
a module is loaded and can also be calculated by the module’s vendor. Since the
hardware ensures that module keys can only be accessed by the corresponding
PM, it is guaranteed that the use of a certain module key (e.g., by creating a
MAC) functions as attestation of the module’s identity.
This scheme works well for remote attestation but can be made more efficient
for local attestation, i.e., the verification of a module’s identity by another module
running on the same node (called secure linking in Sancus terminology). Sancus
provides an instruction that verifies the identity of a module wrt. a given MAC.
A MAC, instead of a simple hash, is used to be able to store it in unprotected
memory and is generated with the key of the module calling the attestation
instruction. Unlike remote attestation, local attestation allows modules from
different vendors to attest each other. Sancus assigns an integer module identifier
to every PM, which is unique within a boot cycle. This can be used to speed-up
local attestation by calling the attestation instruction only once.
Sancus defines secure communication as authenticated and integrity protected
data exchange and provides modules with an instruction that uses the calling
module’s key to produce a MAC of some data. Modules can use this instruction
to communicate securely with their vendor. Sancus’ crypto engine uses HMAC
with spongent [4] as the underlying hash function to calculate MACs.
As our design requires the ability to create a confidential communication
channel between a module and its vendor (Sect. 3), this engine did not suffice. We
replaced the HMAC implementation with SpongeWrap [3] – an authenticated
encryption with associated data mode. Our implementation can be configured to
provide between 64 and 376 bits of security. The interface to the crypto engine is
provided by two instructions: Encrypt takes a plaintext buffer, associated data
(which will be authenticated but not encrypted), and a key and produces the
ciphertext and an authentication tag (i.e., a MAC); Decrypt, given the ciphertext,
associated data, tag and key, produces the original plaintext or raises an error if
the tag is invalid. For both instructions, the key is an optional argument with the
calling module’s key as a default value. As with the original version of Sancus,
this is the only way for a module to use its key.
Secure I/O on Sancus. This section describes how protected drivers can be
implemented using Sancus. Remember that for output channels, we want an
application module to have exclusive access to a driver (Sect. 3). This, in turn,
implies that the driver should have exclusive access to the physical I/O device.
Although for input channels the requirements are less strict – we only need to
authenticate a device – for simplicity, we also use exclusive device access here.
Exclusive Access to Device Registers. Sancus, being based on the MSP430
architecture, uses Memory-Mapped I/O (MMIO) to communicate with devices.
Thus, providing exclusive access to device registers is supported out of the box
by mapping the driver’s private section over the device’s MMIO region. There is
one difficulty, however, caused by the private section of Sancus modules being
contiguous and the MSP430 having a fixed MMIO region (i.e., the addresses
used for MMIO cannot be remapped). Thus, a Sancus module can use its private
section either for MMIO or for data but not for both. Therefore, a module
using MMIO cannot use any memory, including a stack, severely limiting the
functionality this module can implement.
We decided to solve this in software: Driver modules can be split in two
modules, one performing only MMIO (mod-mmio) and one using the API provided
by the former module to implement the driver logic (mod-driver). The task of
mod-mmio is straightforward: for each available MMIO location it implements
entry points for reading and writing this location, and ignores calls by modules
other than mod-driver. This task is simple enough to be implemented using
only registers for data storage, negating the need for an extra data section.
This technique lets us implement exclusive access to device registers on Sancus
without changing the hardware representation of modules. Yet, it incurs a non-
negligible performance impact because mod-mmio has to attest mod-driver on
every call to one of its entry points. Doing the attestation once and only checking
the module identifier on subsequent calls is not applicable because it requires
memory for storing the identifier. We address this by hard-coding the expected
identifier of mod-driver in the code section of mod-mmio. During initialization,
mod-driver checks if it is assigned the expected identifier and otherwise aborts.
mod-driver also attests mod-mmio, verifying module integrity and and exclusive
access to the device’s MMIO registers. On failure, mod-driver aborts as well.
Sancus did not support caller authentication [14], which we require for
mod-mmio to ensure invocation by mod-driver only. We added this feature
by storing the identifier of the previously executing module in a new register,
and added instructions to read and verify this PM identity.
Secure Interrupts. On the MSP430, interrupt handlers are registered by writing
their address to the interrupt vector, a specific memory location. Thus, handling
interrupts inside PMs is done by registering a module’s entry point as an interrupt
handler. However, if the PM also supports “normal” entry points, a way to detect
whether the entry point is called in response to an interrupt is required.
More generally, we need a way to identify which interrupt caused an interrupt
handler to be executed. Otherwise an attacker might be able to inject events
into an application by spoofing calls to an interrupt handler. To this end, we
extended the technique used for caller authentication. When an interrupt occurs,
the processor stores a special value specific to that interrupt in the new register
to keep track of the previously executing module. This way, an interrupt handler
can identify by which interrupt it was called in the same way modules can identify
which module called one of their entry points. The processor ensures that these
special values used to identify interrupts are never assigned to any PM.
Interfacing with Applications. One possibility to interface driver PMs with
application PMs uses Sancus’ secure linking feature (Sect. 4) for efficiency. The
downside of our approach is that the application module has to be deployed on the
same node as the driver. For simplicity, we discuss drivers for single physical events
but the described techniques can easily be extended to drivers supporting multiple
such events. Input drivers provide an entry point to register a callback function
to be invoked when a physical event happens (RegisterInputCb). During the
deployment phase, application modules call this entry point – using Sancus’
secure linking feature – to register one of their entry points as a callback. The
driver’s identifier, which is the result of a successful secure linking step, is stored
in the modules private data section. When a module’s callback entry point is
called, this identifier is compared with the result of the CallerId instruction to
verify it was called by the expected driver.
Output drivers provide an entry point that allows modules to gain exclusive
access (AcquireOutput). When called, this entry point checks if some module
already has exclusive access and, if not, uses CallerId to store the identifier of
the requesting module. It also offers an entry point for posting events which will
check, again using CallerId, if the module posting the event has exclusive access.
During deployment, an application module first attests the output driver, storing
its module identifier, and then calls AcquireOutput, aborting on failure. For
attestation, the application modules provides an entry point for the deployer that
attests that the module has exclusive access. This is implemented by comparing
the driver PM’s current module identifier with that of the module located at the
location where the driver module was loaded at deployment time.
The reason this attestation procedure is secure is as follows. When an ap-
plication module (MA) attests a driver module (MD) during deployment, MA
checks the correctness of MD’s code. This includes, among others, that the code
only allows a single module to have access to the driver, and that it does not
release this access without the module having exclusive access asking for it. If
MA records the module identifier of MD after having attested it, MA can later
check if MD still exists by simply validating the identifier of the PM loaded
at the location where MD was loaded during deployment. This works because
Sancus ensures module identifiers are unique within a boot cycle. If MA calls
AcquireOutput on MD and it succeeds, and later verifies that MD still exists,
MA can be sure it still has exclusive access to MD. This procedure also ensures
that MD has exclusive access to its underlying device.
Compiler and Untrusted Runtime. Our compiler implementation is a literal
translation of the design outlined in Sect. 3. All modifications to the Sancus
compiler are extensions, and all original Sancus features are still available to
programmers (e.g., calling external functions or other PMs). On top of the
existing annotations provided by the Sancus compiler for specifying entry points
(SM ENTRY), internal functions (SM FUNC) and private data (SM DATA), we added
two new annotations: SM INPUT and SM OUTPUT for specifying inputs and outputs.
Fig. 7 shows an example module written in C using our annotations.
SM_OUTPUT(Violation );
SM_DATA int taken , count;
SM_INPUT(Button , data , len) {
if (data [0]) {
taken = 1;
} else {
taken = count = 0;
char event = 0;
Violation (&event , sizeof(event )); } }
SM_INPUT(Tick , data , len) {
if (taken && ++ count > MAX) {
char event = 1;
Violation (&event , sizeof(event )); } }
Fig. 7. A translation of module MVioP1
(Figs. 1 and 2a) to C using the annota-
tions understood by our compiler.
SM OUTPUT expects a name as argument (more specifically, a valid C identifier).
For every output, the compiler generates a function with the following signature:
void name(char* data, size t len). This function can be called to produce
an output event. For input handlers, SM INPUT generates a functions with the
same signature as above. In this function, the programmer has access to a buffer
containing the (unwrapped) payload of the event that caused its execution. For
both inputs and outputs, the names provided in annotations are used in the
deployment descriptor. The untrusted runtime consists the module loader and
the event manager (Sect. 3), both running as regular Contiki [6] processes.
5 Evaluation & Discussion
Component Src (LOC) Bin (B)
Contiki 38386 14880
Event manager 598 1730
Module loader 906 1959
Buttons Driver 338 1016
LCD Driver 137 640
Parking Sensor 43 1383
Aggregator 84 1970
Display 31 1333
Deployment Descriptor 57 n/a
Table 1. Size (“Src”: source code, “Bin”:
binary size) of the software for running the
evaluation scenario. The shaded components
are part of the run-time software TCB.
To assess the runtime overhead
and the size of the software TCB we
have implemented and deployed AAvl
(Figs. 1 and 2b). Each node is config-
ured to provide 64 bits of security. We
install Contiki, our module loader and
event manager, PM drivers for I/O de-
vices (a button driver for the car sen-
sors and a serial LCD driver for the
display), and the application modules.
Tab. 1 shows the sizes of the dif-
ferent software components deployed
on nodes. As can be seen, the major-
ity of the code – about 40 kLOC – is
untrusted. A total of 633 LOC com-
prising of drivers and the actual appli-
cation code is compiled to PMs and needs to be trusted, together with 57 LOC
of the deployment descriptor. That is, only 1.7% of the deployed code base is
part of the software TCB. When looking at the binary sizes of the these software
components, the difference between infrastructure components (18.1 KiB) versus
TCB (6.2 KiB, 25.5%) appears less prominent, which is mostly due to condi-
tionally compiled code in Contiki and compiler generated entry points and stub
code in PMs. Nevertheless, the reduction of the TCB when using our approach is
substantial, leading to a considerably reduced attack surface on each node, and –
importantly – the application owner does not need to trust any infrastructural
software if he reviews the driver modules that his application uses.
We also performed a detailed performance analysis of this example application,
the detailed results are given online in the supplements. For fast devices such
as the button sensors, the overhead of our secure I/O approach can be quite
large: the protected driver executes about 13 times slower than the unprotected
one. However, not much effort was put in optimizing our implementation and
we expect that significant performance gains are possible (e.g., the wrapper for
encrypting output events uses malloc to create a buffer contributing about 30µs
to the overhead). For slower devices such as the serial LCD, it is clear that the
relative overhead drops significantly: the protected driver executes about 7%
slower. Another type of overhead is due to the increased size of events. The
sequence diagram shows that an event containing 2 bytes of useful data, will be
6 times as large. In general, the representation of events has a constant overhead
of 10 bytes: 2 for the nonce and 8 for the MAC. Whether these overheads are
acceptable will depend on the application. Yet, we feel that they are reasonable in
the light of the security guarantees and TCB reduction provided by our approach.
Integrity versus Confidentiality. We have focused our security objective
on integrity and authenticity, and an interesting question is to what extent
we can also provide confidentiality guarantees. It is clear that, thanks to the
isolation properties of protected modules and to the confidentiality properties of
authenticated encryption, our prototype already provides substantial protection
of the confidentiality of both the state of the application as well as the information
contained in events. However, providing a formal statement of the confidentiality
guarantees offered by our approach is non-trivial: some information leaks to the
attacker, such as for instance when (and how often) modules send events to each
other. This in turn can leak information about the internal state of modules or
about the content of events. The ultimate goal would be to make compilation
and deployment fully abstract [1] (indicating roughly that the compiled system
leaks no more information than can be understood from the source code), but
our current approach is clearly not fully abstract yet. Hence, we decided to focus
on strong integrity first, and leave confidentiality guarantees for future work.
Hardware Attacks and Side-Channels. Although hardware attacks and side-
channels are explicitly ruled out by our attacker model (Sect. 2), it is necessary
to discuss the impact an attacker would have given access to such techniques.
An attacker that successfully circumvents the hardware protections on a node
would be able to manipulate and impersonate all modules running on that node.
That is, the attacker would be able to inject events into an application but only
for those connections that originate from the compromised node. The impact on
the application obviously depends on the kind of modules that run on the node.
If it is an output module, the application is completely compromised since the
attacker can now produce any output they want. If, on the other hand, it is one
among many sensor nodes, the impact may be minor.
Given the kind of small microprocessors that we target, many side-channels
such as cache timing attacks or page fault channels are not applicable. We leave
an analysis of our implementation for side-channels for future work.
6 Related Work
A survey of hardware-based trusted computing architectures for isolation
and attestation has been published in [8], and describes a number of platforms
our approach could use. These range from Intel SGX over ARM’s TrustZone to
embedded architectures such as SMART and TyTAN. Notably, Sancus [14] is
the only available embedded PMA, and the only open-source PMA overall. The
secure compilation techniques for PMAs were proposed by Agten et al. [2].
Earlier techniques to establish a notion of trusted I/O paths are BitE [10],
Flicker [9] and Bumpy [11]. Our approach improves over these by significantly
reducing the size of the software TCB, from a full OS to less than 1 kLOC. By
using Sancus as a PMA, we enable the integration of attestable software and I/O
encryption directly into the input device. Techniques such as Flicker or SGX can
be used to protect host software when communicating with Sancus nodes.
The VC3 system [15] is related to our work in the sense that they also provide
strong security guarantees to the deployer of an application using SGX as a PMA,
but they focus on correctness, confidentiality and completeness of Map-Reduce
computations in a cloud-setting and hence do not need to deal with I/O.
The safe and secure deployment and use of devices in the domains of Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) and the IoT remains an open challenge. A number of
schemes for distributed trust management for WSNs are surveyed in [7], which
allow individual nodes to obtain trust values for neighboring nodes by observing
these nodes’ behavior. In [13], Sancus is used to securely inspect and assess
the trustworthiness of unprotected software on WSN and IoT nodes directly.
This kind of trust management is suitable to detect the systematic failure or
misbehavior of nodes, but there are no inherent guarantees wrt. the authenticity
of distributed computations being provided. We address this shortcoming by
protecting all components of a distributed application throughout their life-cycle.
7 Conclusions
We have extended Sancus, a light-weight embedded protected module ar-
chitecture with support for secure I/O, which enables the execution of reactive
(event-driven) distributed applications on a shared infrastructure with strong
authenticity guarantees and in the presence of capable attackers, while relying on
a very small TCB. We foresee compelling use cases in IoT and control systems.
ACKs. This research is partially funded by the Research Fund KU Leuven.
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